




The Emergence and Evolution of Regional Convergence 
Clusters in China’s Energy Markets 
 















WORKING PAPER No. 14/2010 
 
The Emergence and Evolution of Regional Convergence Clusters in 
China’s Energy Markets 
 
Hengyun Ma 




April 20, 2010 
 
Abstract: Employing the new regression tests for Convergence, Club Convergence 
and Clustering proposed by Phillips and Sul (2007), this paper models and analyzes 
the  behavior  of  China‘s  energy  sectors.  Energy  market  ‗convergence  clusters‘  are 
identified using new price data and their regional spatial distributions are mapped for 
four major fuel types; coal, gasoline, diesel and electricity. It is found that: i) as yet, 
there  are  no  fully  integrated  national  energy  markets  in  China  as  more  than  one 
convergence cluster is identified for all four fuels; ii) some regional energy markets 
can  be  regarded  as  ‗quite  mature‘  as  evidenced  by  the  existence  of  some  highly 
concentrated  convergence  clusters  connected  geographically;  iii)  some  regional 
markets remain in a ‗state of transition‘ as witnessed by convergence clusters that are 
scattered geographically and growing in membership; vi) it seems that there is more 
regional-based integration for coal and electricity than for gasoline and diesel as more 
convergent clusters were identified for coal and electricity than for gasoline and diesel 
v) Overall, China still appears to be in the    process of energy market integration as 
demonstrated by the number and evolution of convergence clusters over time. 
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The Emergence and Evolution of Regional Convergence Clusters in 
China’s Energy Markets 
 
1. Introduction 
China is the world‘s most populous and largest developing, transition economy, and 
assessments of its market performance have been mixed. On the one hand, China has 
been praised for promoting market competition among the state-owned, collective and 
private  sectors  (Qian  and  Xu,  1993).  As  a  result,  many  authors  studying  China‘s 
market economy have concluded that some of China‘s markets are integrated. Rozelle 
et al. (1997), for example, investigate market integration in China‘s rural sectors in the 
late 1990s and find evidence in favour of such a transition. Zhou et al. (2000), Park et 
al.  (2002),  Huang  and  Rozelle  (2006),  and  Awokuse  (2007)  investigate  market 
integration in China‘s agricultural commodity markets and all found that the grain 
markets  were  well  integrated.  Fan  and  Wei  (2006)  also  conducted  tests  for  price 
convergence amongst 96 commodities and concluded that prices had converged to the 
‗Law of One Price‘ in China for an overwhelming majority of goods and services. 
However, some recent articles argue that changing patterns of provincial economic 
structure suggest that China‘s markets have become less rather than more nationally 
integrated  during  much  of  the  reform  period.  Some  conclude  that  the  effects  of 
reforms have been to create a number of ‗regional convergence clubs‘ rather than one 
single national market.  For example, Weeks and Yao (2003) found that there was  
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system-wide income divergence during the reform period (1978-1997) as witnessed 
by  the  fact  that  the  coastal  provinces  do  not  share  a  common  initial  technology 
progress rate with the interior provinces. Young (2000) argues that China‘s economic 
reform  has  actually  led  to  the  fragmentation  of  domestic  markets.  Poncet  (2005) 
measured China‘s domestic market disintegration and identified its determinants and 
she concluded that China is a fragmented economy. Demurger et al. (2002) states that 
this is not surprising given the substantial differences in regional, location-specific 
advantages  and  central  government  preferential  policy,  which  have  resulted  in 
economic  development  disintegration  in  China.  Maasoumi  and  Wang  (2008)  also 
investigate  further  evidence  of  regional  economic  reforms,  economic  growth  and 
economic  development  convergence  using  a  metric  entropy-based  measure.  Their 
results show that there exist many small economic development convergence clubs in 
both the pre- and post-reform periods for China. 
Based on the above discussions, it might be reasonable to expect that China is 
not yet a completely integrated market economy, and that it is still effectively in a 
state  of  transition.  The  final  outcome  may  be  the  formation  of  powerful, 
geographically disconnected (or partially connected) regional growth zones. However, 
rejection  of  convergence  for  the  country  as  a  whole  does  not  imply  there  is  no 
evidence of convergence within regional subgroups. Examples include the possible 
existence of convergence clusters around separate points of equilibria or steady state 
growth paths, as well as cases where there may be both convergence clusters and 
divergent members in the full panel of regions or sectors. These convergence clubs  
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may be geographically linked, ie., coastal; east-west; north-south, or natural resource 
based.  If  there  are  local  equilibria  or  club  convergence  clusters,  then  it  is  of 
considerable interest as to where they are, in what sectors and whether they have/are 
evolving over time. The new testing procedures of Phillips and Sul (2007) enable us 
to  identify  the  existence  of  such  clusters  including  their  number,  composition, 
membership and evolution. 
Though some studies have identified economic convergence clubs for China (e.g., 
Maasoumi and Wang, 2008), there have been few econometric tests of ‗convergence 
clustering‘ for important, specific commodity markets. Exceptions include, Ma et al. 
(2009) and Ma and Oxley (2010) who investigated the convergence of major energy 
fuel price series using traditional unit root and panel cointegration methods. They 
found that energy price series are not convergent as a whole and regional energy price 
series  display  a  differing  convergent  pattern,  implying  that  there  might  be  some 
regional energy markets in China. 
The study presented here uses the new and more powerful methods of Phillips 
and  Sul  (2007)  to  investigate  the  existence  of  regional  convergence  clubs  and 
crucially the transitional dynamics of their formation. The new econometric tests are 
applied to China‘s four major fuel price series, coal, electricity, gasoline and diesel, 
using a unique, high frequency dataset.   
    The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces China‘s major energy 
reforms  to  provide  the  historical  background  necessary  to  enable  sensible 
interpretation  of  the  results  of  the  tests.  Although  econometrically  powerful,  the  
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testing approach of Phillips and Sul (2007) is atheoretical in that it requires no prior, 
specific inputs or assumptions on potential, regional, convergence club locations or 
associations. Section 3 outlines the testing approach and how it is applied to the data, 
which are also discussed in this section. Section 4 presents the empirical results and 
discussion.  The  final  section  presents  some  conclusions  and  possible  policy 
implications. 
 
2. China’s major energy sector reforms 
China‘s  energy  reforms have recently been extensively documented  and discussed 
(see Ma et al. 2009). Here we simply describe some of the major energy reforms in 
China, which have apparently led to significant changes in behavior to demonstrate 
the effects of the gradual reform process. Within the period of analysis, there were 
four major energy reforms of fuel price changes (see Figure 1). These major energy 
reforms occurred in 1997, 1999, 2002 and 2004, respectively. 
    Firstly,  as  more  coal  entered  the  ‗free‘  market,  the  controlled  low  price  of 
‗in-plan‘  coal  was  difficult  to  sustain.  Consequently,  coal  prices  were  gradually 
relaxed and for the first time in 1997—intense bargaining between coal companies 
and power plants was introduced (Hang and Tu, 2007). This led to a sharp increase in 
the price of coal from March 1997. Meanwhile, to simplify the control of prices, a 
new scheme, ‗operation-period price‘ and ‗yardstick price‘, was adopted for electricity 
pricing  in  1997.  The  price  under  this  scheme  was  based  on  an  average  social 
generation cost and a unified internal rate of return on capital over the remaining  
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operation period. For present plants, this is indeed an operation-period price while for 
new plants the scheme actually specifies a unified yardstick price (Ma and He, 2008). 
This price reform led to a steady increase in the price of electricity post- 1997 when 
prices also became more volatile (Panel A of Figure 1) 
    Secondly, domestic petroleum prices have, since 1999, been set in accordance 
with  the  international  market  (Hang  and  Tu,  2007).  Central  government  sets  the 
regional prices of refined oil products according to the Singaporean oil market and as 
a  result,  the  1998  reform  resulted  in  domestic  petroleum  prices  increasing 
substantially (Wu, 2003). As can be observed from Panel B of Figure 1, spot prices of 
gasoline and diesel increased sharply, from approximately ¥2500/ton in the mid 1999 
to over ¥4000/ton in October 2000, and then continuously regressed for one year until 
the beginning 2002.   
Thirdly, the system of government-guided price of coal was abandoned while 
electricity tariffs remained regulated from 2002 (Wang, 2007). As a result, the coal 
price  jumped  in  2000  from  approximately  ¥250/ton  to  ¥270/ton,  while  electricity 
prices maintained at or about their previous trends. As a result, bargaining between 
the two parties became more intense post-2002. Only 90 million metric tons of coal 
was contracted in that year, which was less than 37% of the total demand for coal by 
power generators. Faced with serious power shortages, the National Development and 
Reform Committee issued an order such that the price of coal to generators was to be 
set as the midpoint between the requirements of the two parties in 2003 (Wang, 2007). 
Coincidently, petroleum prices had begun to rise, from ¥3000/ton and ¥2700/ton in  
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early  2002  to  ¥5700/ton  and  ¥4700/ton  at  the  end  2005  for  gasoline  and  diesel, 
respectively. 
Finally,  the  government  introduced  a  new  coal  pricing  policy  called  the 
‗co-movement‘ of prices of both coal and electricity in 2004 (Ma and He, 2008). The 
co-movement  was  not  a  free  market  adjustment,  but  regulated  and  determined 
periodically by the State Development and Reform Committee to avoid extreme price 
fluctuations. Adjustments would only be made if coal price fluctuations exceeded 5%, 
otherwise, the change would be accumulated to the next adjustment period. However, 
as can been observed, it seems that this reform might not make the prices of coal and 
electricity econometrically cointegrated. Panel A of Figure 1 shows that coal prices 
increased sharply while electricity prices remained almost constant during 2004. 
Based upon the brief discussion above, and the details presented as Figure 1, 
China‘s energy reforms and energy prices apparently demonstrate a gradual, evolving, 
process. As a consequence, we might expect to see that, if convergence clustering 
were to exist, it too would involve a gradual process, which evolves over time and 
space. For example, it may be expected that there are more convergence clusters being 
established during the transition period (e.g., 01/1997-12/1998) than during the new 
regime  (01/1999-12/2005)  given  other  factors  are  held  constant  (e.g.,  energy 
transportation,  energy  supplying  areas).  Therefore,  to  test  for  energy  price 
convergence cluster formation against various energy reform backgrounds, we will 
divide the whole study period into four sub-periods (refer to Figure 1); the control 
period  (01/1996-12/1998);  the  transition  period  (01/1997-12/1998);  the  pre  new  
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regime (01/1999-12/2001); and the post new regime (01/2002-12/2005). 
Finding evidence of regional convergence clusters, i.e., regions where the ‗Law 
of One Price‘ holds for a commodity or group of commodities could occur for one of 
two reasons. Firstly, the free actions of markets may lead to the removal of arbitrage 
opportunities as in the traditional convergence story. Clusters may be ‗regional‘ rather 
than a single ‗national‘ market where all prices are the same independent of location, 
because  of  the  real-world  existence  of  significant  transactions  costs,  which  the 
traditional  theory  of  the  ―Law‖  assumes  are  zero.  An  alternative  explanation  of 
regional convergence clusters is that the Central government control of prices process 
has either explicitly or ‗by accident‘ created such price convergence, as a consequence 
of the control process itself. 
 
3. Method and data 
3.1 Method 
Phillips  and  Sul  (2007)  develop  a  new  and  powerful  approach  for  modeling  and 
identifying both the existence of convergence clusters and the economic transition 
behavior  in  the  presence  of  common  growth  characteristics.  The  approach  is  a 
nonlinear factor model with a growth component and a time varying idiosyncratic 
component that allows for quite general heterogeneity across individuals/regions and 
over time. The formulation is particularly useful in measuring transition towards a 
long run growth path or individual transitions over time relative to some common 
trend,  representative,  or  aggregate  variable.  The  formulation  also  gives  rise  to  a  
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simple and convenient time series regression test for convergence. This convergence 
test further provides the basis for a stepwise clustering algorithm that is proposed for 
finding  convergence  clusters  in  panel  data  setting  and  for  analyzing  transition 
behavior  between  clusters  and  over  time.  The  tests  have  excellent  asymptotic 
properties, including local discriminatory power, and are particularly easy to apply in 
practice. 
The Phillips-Sul procedure proposes that there exists a core subgroup and then 
follows a four-step approach to try and identify it by: i) last observation ordering, ii) 
core group formation, iii) sieving individuals for club membership, and iv) a stopping 
rule. For a detailed explanation, see Phillips and Sul (2007). 
   This  new  approach  is  highly  appropriate  for  investigation  of  the  potential  to 
identify  whether  China  has  energy  market  convergence  clubs  given  the  gradual 
economic reform characteristics discussed in Section 2. 
3.2 Data 
The dataset comprises a panel of 10-day prices for four energy products in 35 major 
Chinese cities.
1  The price data are collected by the China Price Monitoring Centre – a 
division of the State Development and Reform Commission of the People‘s Republic 
of  China.  The  data  relate  to  spot  prices  and  are  regularly  collected  on  a  ten-day 
interval  (the  5
th,  15
th  and  25
th  of  each  month)  from  local  markets  by  local 
governmental agencies.
2 
                                                        
1  These  cities  are  Beijing,  Tianjin,  Shijiazhuang,  Taiyuan,  Hohhot,  Shenyang,  Changchun,  Harbin,  Shanghai, 
Nanjing,  Hangzhou,  Hefei,  Fuzhou,  Nanchang,  Jinan,  Zhengzhou,  Wuhan,  Changsha,  Guangzhou,  Nanning, 
Haikou, Chongqing, Chengdu, Guiyang, Kunming, Lhasa, Xi‘an, Lanzhou, Xining, Yinchuan, Urumqi, Qingdao, 
Dalian, Xiamen and Ningbo. 
2  The  price  data  are  collected  to  provide  price  information  to  the  central  and  local  governments  for  
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Unlike other market price data, the fuel price data have no missing observations 
during the study period as fuels are extensively used in all cities. We use four major 
fuel  products;  coal,  electricity,  gasoline  and  diesel.  These  panel  data  are  truly 
nationally  representative  as  they  cover  the  main  fuel  components,  all  provincial 
capital cities of mainland China, and the period, January 1995 to December 2005. 
This is to be contrasted with most other empirical studies, which use a price index of 
lower  frequency  (typically  annual)  data.  The  10-day  frequency  of  the  data  also 
corresponds well to the time required for domestic price arbitrage as lower frequency 
(monthly) price data are less likely to show any rapid arbitrage when we wish to test 
for price convergence with any degree of precision (Taylor, 2001). 
     The quality of Chinese data is often criticised as  reporting in China is often 
affected by political factors (Rawski, 2001). However, we believe that the data for 
specific  product  prices  collected  by  local  government  agencies  under  strict 
government mandates are unlikely to be subject to manipulation. Central government 
requires the collection of prices for specific products at fixed dates and locations and 
these price data are also available to the public so that local officials would find it 
hard  to  report  false  data.  Unlike  macro-economic  data  (such  as  GDP  growth  and 
employment rates), these micro data for prices could hardly serve as indicators when 
assessing  the  performance  of  local  officials  and  hence  local  officials  have  little 
incentive to falsify them. 
                                                                                                                                                               
macroeconomic management. According to state law, the local price bureaus in 31 major cities are obligated to 
report price information for a specified list of products to the Price Information Center. The price information must 
be collected from fixed local markets. The fuel price information is collected three times a month, on the 5
th, the 
15
th and the 25





4. Results and analyses 
Following Phillips and Sul (2007), we empirically model China‘s energy markets and 
analyze  the  transition  behavior  by  identifying  convergence  clusters  and  map  their 
geographic distribution. 
4.1 Identifying Convergent clusters 
The  convergence  clusters  identified  are  listed  in  Tables  1,  2,  3  and  4  for  coal, 
electricity, gasoline and diesel over three major energy reform periods, respectively. 
The following points can be made identified based on our observations and analyses: 
Firstly, there are apparent variations in the numbers of convergence clusters and 
changes in their composition and membership over the three energy reform periods 
across the four major fuel price series. For example, it seems that there were more 
convergence  clusters  during  latest  sub-period  (2002-2005)  for  coal  and  electricity 
(five clusters each, Tables 1 and 2) than gasoline and diesel (three and two clusters, 
respectively, Tables 3 and 4). This suggests that gasoline and diesel markets might be 
more integrated than coal and electricity markets in China. In fact, this finding is 
consistent with the recent conclusion of Ma et al. 2009. The primary causes here are 
likely  due  to  the-  cost-constraining  characteristics  of  coal  transportation  and 
electricity transmission networks. 
Secondly,  there  were  fewer  convergence  clusters  during  the  first  (controlled) 
sub-period (1995-1996) than during the other three sub-periods except for electricity. 
For example, there were two convergence clusters for coal market during the first  
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sub-period (Table 1), while there was only one cluster for gasoline and diesel markets 
during the same sub-period (Tables 3 and 4). It should be noted that this situation is 
probably the result of government energy regulation rather than by the operations of a 
freer energy market due to liberalization. As can be seen from Figure 1 and previous 
sections, energy prices were generally regulated by government agencies during this 
period (1995-1996), potentially creating convergence in prices via central control.     
Thirdly, as can be seen from Table 2, there were nine convergence clusters for 
electricity price series during the first (controlled) sub-period (1995-1966). This is the 
largest number of separate convergence clusters identified in the analysis and is more 
than for any other three sub-periods or any other fuel. The reason is unclear, however, 
it is most likely due to the many new price policies created during the early 1990s. 
For example, in 1991, a ‗high-in‘ and ‗high-out‘ policy was introduced; in 1993, a 
‗new plant-new price‘ policy was implemented; in the 1990s, ‗Power Construction 
Fund‘ and ‗Three Gorge Construction Fund‘ were imposed (Ma and He, 2008). As a 
result, electricity tariffs have risen rapidly and apparently vary regionally (Lam, 2004). 
These policies were stopped when a new price scheme (operation-period price and 
yardstick price) was adopted in 1997. 
Fourthly  it  seems  that  more  separate  convergence  clusters  have  appeared  as 
energy reforms have emerged. A typical case may be seen from the results on the coal 
price series, for example, there were only two convergence clusters during the first 
(controlled)  sub-period  (1995-1996),  three  convergence  clusters  during  the  second 
sub-period (1997-1998), and four convergence clusters during the third sub-period  
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(1999-2001), while there were five convergence clusters during the latest sub-period 
(2002-2005), see (Table 1). The same cluster pattern can be found for the electricity 
price series during the last three sub-periods (Table 2). For the gasoline price series, 
there were also more convergence clusters during the last two sub-periods (3 each) 
than during the first two sub-periods (1 and 2, respectively, Table 3). Only for the 
diesel price series, does it seem that fewer convergence clusters can be isolated for the 
latest sub-period (2002-2005) than during the middle two sub-periods (4 each, Table 
4). 
Finally,  what  do  the  above  results  suggest?  There  are  several  possible 
explanations and implications for China and its energy market. On the one hand, one 
might  expect  to  see  fewer  separate  convergence  clusters  (but  with  more 
members/regions included) as the energy reforms take effect. In particular, a fully 
integrated ‗national‘ market would include all regions in a ‗single‘ cluster – the nation. 
However, this extreme case may not be an informed expectation given the size and 
geographic  heterogeneity  of  the  country  where  there  are  substantial  variations  in 
economic  growth,  energy  reserves  and  geographical  location  across  regions. 
Therefore, some convergence clusters are likely expected, but gradually reducing in 
number, but increasing in membership, over time. If this pattern of gradual reduction 
in the number of clusters is not identified over time, one might reasonably conclude 
that China‘s energy markets are not fully integrated. Geography, distance or effective 
central  government  regional  price  policy  variations  may  dominate  the  predicted 
effects of the ‗Law of One price‘. However, the evidence found here is that there are  
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more  convergence  clusters  identified  during  the  latest  sub-period  than  earlier 
suggesting that China‘s energy markets have become somewhat freer of the effects of 
regulation.  This  may be particularly true  for the coal  and  electricity markets.  For 
example, during the 1995-1996 period there were more coal mines, both small private 
and large state-owned, but they were regulated by the government. As a result there 
might have been less variation in the wholesale price of coal and therefore fewer 
convergence clusters. However, during the ‗new regime‘ period, as more coal reserves 
are  found  and  explored  and  more  market  deregulation  and  decentralization,  there 
might  emerge  more  regional-based  coal  markets,  and  therefore  there  might  be  an 
increase in the number of coal price convergence clusters identified during this period. 
Likewise,  as  more  coal-burning  power  plants  and  more  electricity  transmission 
networks are constructed, there might appear to be more regional-based electricity 
markets, and therefore more electricity convergence clusters will be identified and 
measured.   
4.2 The dynamics of convergent clusters 
As well as    identifying the number and coverage of convergence clusters for each of 
fuel price series over the various sub-periods, we can also observe the    dynamics of 
moving ‗in and out‘ of a particular convergence cluster by each city and over three 
sub-periods. The following interesting observations can be made: 
Firstly,  though,  in  general,  there  were  two  convergence  clusters  during  both 
1996-1997 and 1997-1998 periods, actually, one of convergent clusters has already 
covered  most  of  cities  for  coal  (Table  1).  For  example,  about  77%  of  cities  are  
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included in Cluster One during 1995-1996 and about 74% of cities are included in 
Cluster Two during 1997-1998. This  may  indicate that convergent  clusters  almost 
remain identical between both sub-periods. However, some cities still form a separate 
small  Cluster  One:  Beijing,  Chongqing,  Dalian,  Chengdu  and  Xining  are  staying 
while Taiyuan and Guiyang are leaving Cluster Two. Only two cities (Yinchuan and 
Xi‘an), off Cluster Two, form Cluster Three.   
A  similar  cluster  dynamic  can  be  seen  for  movements  from  the  second 
sub-period to the third sub-period. For example, most of the cities stay in Cluster One, 
while most of cities still remain in Cluster Two. Only a few cities from Cluster Two 
moved to Cluster One (Hohhot, Changchun, Wuhan, Shijiazhuang, Guangzhou and 
Haikou) and to Cluster Three (Lanzhou and Urumqi). It will be clearer if we sort 
Table 1 using column 5. 
It seems, however, that  convergence clusters demonstrate more of a dynamic 
during the last two sub-periods. Those that used to belong to Cluster One in the third 
sub-period  form  into  three  different  clusters:  nearly  half  of  (rows  1-5:  Beijing, 
Taiyuan, Chongqing, Dalian and Hohhot) still stay in Cluster One; three (rows 7-9: 
Guiyang, Changchun and Wuhan) go to Cluster Two, and three (rows 18-20: Xining, 
Shijiazhuang and Guangzhou) move to Cluster Three. Similarly, those that used to 
belong to Cluster Two in the third sub-period are also broken into three convergent 
clusters: of which 37% (rows 10-16) still stay, 37% (rows 21-27) go to Cluster Three, 
and 26% (rows 29-33) go to Cluster Four.   
Secondly,  there  appears  more  dynamic  movement  for  electricity  convergence  
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clusters with the majority of cities shifting among the clusters, and as a result, there 
are rarely cities that stay in successive sub-period clusters. As can be seen from Table 
2, for example, only Jinan and Nanchuang successively remain in three same clusters 
(One  and  Two,  respectively).  There  are  only  three  cities  (Hefei,  Shanghai  and 
Changchun)  that  stay  in  the  same  successive  luster  (One,  Two  and  Three, 
respectively). Therefore, it seems there are no strict patterns or rules as to how city 
markets form convergent clusters and how these convergent clusters decompose into 
new clusters   
However, it does seem that there are    clearer dynamic convergence patterns that 
emerge for the second and the third sub-periods if we sort the cities of Table 2 by 
column 6 first and then columns 5, and 4. For example, some of the cities that used to 
belong to Cluster One and Three converge to form Cluster One; part of cities that used 
to belong to Cluster One and Two converge to form Cluster Two; some of the cities 
that used to belong to Cluster One converge to form Cluster Three; and some of the 
cities that used to belong to Cluster One, Two and Three converge to form Cluster 
Three. 
Thirdly,  the  dynamics  of  gasoline  convergent  clusters  seems  to  be  relatively 
simple  (Table 3).  All  cities  stay in  the same  convergent  cluster under  the control 
sub-period (1995-1996), then with gradual price decentralization, some cities move 
out and form a new small Cluster Two. By the third stage, most cities are included in 
Cluster Two and only a few cities comprise Cluster One and Cluster Three. While 
more cities that used to belong to Cluster Two move to Cluster One and Cluster Three  
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by the last period the majority of cities comprise Cluster Two.   
Finally, by the second stage (1997-1998), approximately 40% and 30% of cities 
form two larger clusters (Cluster One and Cluster Three), respectively, while only a 
few cities form two smaller clusters (Cluster Two and Cluster Four). By the third 
stage (1999-2001), most of Cluster Two and a large part of Cluster Three, (plus a few 
cities from each of Cluster Two and Cluster Four), form a large Cluster Two. A few 
cities from each of the previous clusters form Cluster Three. By the last period, the 
memberships of cities that converge to a new Cluster are mixed.  The majority of 
Cluster Two and half of Cluster Three combine into Cluster One, while some of the 
cities from each of Cluster Two and Cluster Three form Cluster Two.   
4.3 The geography of convergent clusters 
In the next stage, we consider the geographical distribution of convergence clusters to 
consider whether the atheortic test results make geographic sense. Theoretically, it 
might be expected that the patterns of convergence clusters should become gradually 
more concentrated and connected geographically as the energy reforms take effect. 
This is a testable hypothesis which we can investigate using the clustering analysis of 
Phillips and Sul. Figures 2 through to 5 present the geographical characteristics and 
evolution  of  convergence  clusters  over  the  four  sub-periods  for  coal,  electricity, 
gasoline and diesel, respectively. The Figures are created using the same tests results 
as  those  presented  as  Tables  1-4  and  as  discussed  in  the  previous  section.  The 
following points can be observed from these Figures: 
Firstly,  there  is  some  evidence  showing  that  new  convergence  clusters  have  
 
18 
appeared following the reforms process and were concentrated geographically. For 
example, Cluster One for coal was scattered across vast areas of China during the 
third sub-period (1999-2001), covering twelve city markets (Panel C of Figure 2).   
However, during the latest sub-period (2002-2005) this cluster evolved into Cluster 
One (in the north, except for Chongqing and Beijing) and Cluster Two (in the south, 
except for Changchun and Fuzhou), which connected primarily on geographic lines 
(Panel D of Figure 2). 
Secondly, there is apparent evidence showing a trend in convergence clusters 
becoming more and more concentrated and geographically connected. This seems to 
follow for all fuels, and is especially evident during the ‗new regime‘, for example, 
Cluster Three for coal was geographically separate during the third sub-period (Panel 
C  of  Figure  2),  while  this  cluster  was  geographically  connected  during  the  latest 
sub-period (Panel D of Figure 2). In addition, electricity Cluster Four was extremely 
scattered during the third sub-period (Panel C, Figure 3), while it finally evolved 
during the last sub-period into Cluster Two, which was mainly concentrated around 
Nanning,  Chongqing,  Chengdu,  Guiyang,  Kunming,  Lanzhou,  Yinchuan  and 
Nanchang and Zhengzhou (Panel D, Figure 3, Table 2). 
Thirdly,  there  is  apparent  evidence  showing  that  the  convergence  clusters 
evolved ‗rationally‘, for example, Cluster Two for diesel  appeared to be scattered 
across the country from the far west (Urumqi) to far east (Hangzhou) and from far 
south  (Haikou)  to  far  northeast  (Harbin)  during  the  third  sub-period  (Panel  C  of 
Figure 5, Table 4). This may be more evidence of central attempts to control prices  
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than a rational market outcome. However, this cluster evolved to represent groups 
identified as west to east and concentrated from far east to the center during the latest 
sub-period (Panel D of Figure 5).   
Finally, the same can be observed for Cluster Two during the third sub-period 
(Panel C of Figure 4) and Cluster Two during the last sub-period (Panel D of Figure 
4). This cluster was scattered across almost all the country during the third sub-period 
(Panel C of Figure 4), while it evolved to remove many of the remote areas, such as 
Lhasa, Hohhot and Harbin, in the last sub-period (Panel D of Figure 4). The changing 
composition  and  configuration  of  clusters  that have  evolved  over  time  appears  to 
make sense in that they are what one might expect to see given the geography and 
population and commerce concentrations that have emerged in China. That there is 
not one single (national) cluster is evidence of the lack of full market integration, but 
evidence  of  a  growing  number  of  ‗sensibly  located‘  regional  clusters,  could  be 
construed that market integration is ‗in process‘.   
 
5. Concluding remarkets 
This paper employs the new testing approach of Phillips and Sul (2007) to model 
and  analyze  China‘s  energy  sector  price  transition  behavior  in  the  presence  of 
common  movement  characteristics.  Price  convergence  clusters  are  identified  and 
presented and analyzed. The spatial distributions of convergence clusters are mapped 
and discussed over four sub-periods for each of four fuels. 
The paper found some evidence showing that a number of regional convergence  
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clusters have appeared for the major energy markets in China as the reforms have 
been gradually. Some conclusions that can be drawn are: 
Firstly, there is no single nationally integrated energy market in China as there 
exist more than one convergence cluster for all four fuels, especially during the latest 
sub-period. Secondly, some regional energy markets have become more mature as 
some convergence clusters have become more highly concentrated and geographically 
connected. Thirdly, some regional markets still seem to be evolving and developing as 
the convergence clusters identified remain  geographically scattered.  Fourthly, it is 
consistent with the characteristics of the various types of energies tested, that more 
regional integrated markets exist for coal and electricity than for gasoline and diesel. 
Fifthly, the dynamics of convergent clusters is different across energy types. As a 
consequence,    convergence clusters for the electricity market are the most dynamic, 
while those for the gasoline market are the least dynamic. Finally, China is still in the 
process of energy market integration as evidenced by the continuing evolution of the 
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Table 1. Regional coal market convergence and clustering analysis results 
Cities  Code  Row  1995-1996  1997-1998  1999-2001  2002-2005 
Beijing  1  1  1  1  1  1 
Taiyuan  4  2  2  1  1  1 
Chongqing  22  3  1  1  1  1 
Dalian  33  4  1  1  1  1 
Hohhot  5  5  1  2  1  1 
Yinchuan  30  6  2  3  4  1 
Guiyang  24  7  2  1  1  2 
Changchun  7  8  1  2  1  2 
Wuhan  17  9  1  2  1  2 
Chengdu  23  10  1  1  2  2 
Shanghai  9  11  1  2  2  2 
Hefei  12  12  1  2  2  2 
Fuzhou  13  13  1  2  2  2 
Jinan  15  14  2  2  2  2 
Zhengzhou  16  15  1  2  2  2 
Changsha  18  16  2  2  2  2 
Kunming  25  17  1  2  4  2 
Xining  29  18  1  1  1  3 
Shijiazhuang  3  19  1  2  1  3 
Guangzhou  19  20  1  2  1  3 
Tianjin  2  21  1  2  2  3 
Hangzhou  11  22  1  2  2  3 
Nanchang  14  23  1  2  2  3 
Lhasa  26  24  1  2  2  3 
Qingdao  32  25  1  2  2  3 
Xiamen  34  26  1  2  2  3 
Ningbo  35  27  1  2  2  3 
Haikou  21  28  1  2  1  4 
Shenyang  6  29  1  2  2  4 
Harbin  8  30  1  2  2  4 
Nanjing  10  31  1  2  2  4 
Nanning  20  32  1  2  2  4 
Xi'an  27  33  2  3  2  4 
Lanzhou  28  34  2  2  3  5 
Urumqi  31  35  2  2  3  5 
# of Cluster  -  -  2  3  4  5 





Table 2. Regional electricity market convergence and clustering analysis results 
Cities  Code  Row  1995-1996  1997-1998  1999-2001  2002-2005 
Jinan  15  1  7  1  1  1 
Hefei  12  2  4  3  1  1 
Taiyuan  4  3  7  2  2  1 
Urumqi  31  4  3  1  3  1 
Xining  29  5  2  3  5  1 
Shenyang  6  6  6  3  5  1 
Harbin  8  7  5  1  1  2 
Nanning  20  8  8  3  1  2 
Shanghai  9  9  6  1  2  2 
Nanchang  14  10  6  2  2  2 
Chengdu  23  11  7  1  3  2 
Beijing  1  12  5  2  3  2 
Ningbo  35  13  6  1  4  2 
Lanzhou  28  14  5  1  4  2 
Chongqing  22  15  6  2  4  2 
Kunming  25  16  3  2  4  2 
Guiyang  24  17  9  3  4  2 
Zhengzhou  16  18  4  3  4  2 
Yinchuan  30  19  9  3  5  2 
Nanjing  10  20  1  1  1  3 
Dalian  33  21  2  2  1  3 
Changsha  18  22  8  1  2  3 
Xiamen  34  23  7  1  2  3 
Haikou  21  24  7  1  2  3 
Lhasa  26  25  6  2  2  3 
Changchun  7  26  4  1  3  3 
Shijiazhuang  3  27  3  1  4  3 
Tianjin  2  28  6  2  4  3 
Qingdao  32  29  6  2  4  3 
Xi'an  27  30  9  3  5  3 
Hohhot  5  31  2  1  1  4 
Wuhan  17  32  4  2  2  4 
Guangzhou  19  33  5  1  3  5 
Hangzhou  11  34  1  2  4  5 
Fuzhou  13  35  4  2  5  5 
# of Cluster  -  -  9  3  5  5 





Table 3. Regional gasoline market convergence and clustering analysis results 
Cities  Code  Row  1995-1996  1997-1998  1999-2001  2002-2005 
Wuhan  17  1  1  1  1  1 
Lhasa  26  2  1  1  1  1 
Beijing  1  3  1  1  2  1 
Hohhot  5  4  1  1  2  1 
Chengdu  23  5  1  1  2  1 
Guangzhou  19  6  1  2  2  1 
Chongqing  22  7  1  1  2  2 
Dalian  33  8  1  1  2  2 
Yinchuan  30  9  1  1  2  2 
Guiyang  24  10  1  1  2  2 
Shanghai  9  11  1  1  2  2 
Fuzhou  13  12  1  1  2  2 
Zhengzhou  16  13  1  1  2  2 
Changsha  18  14  1  1  2  2 
Kunming  25  15  1  1  2  2 
Shijiazhuang  3  16  1  1  2  2 
Tianjin  2  17  1  1  2  2 
Nanchang  14  18  1  1  2  2 
Xiamen  34  19  1  1  2  2 
Haikou  21  20  1  1  2  2 
Shenyang  6  21  1  1  2  2 
Xi'an  27  22  1  1  2  2 
Lanzhou  28  23  1  1  2  2 
Urumqi  31  24  1  1  2  2 
Jinan  15  25  1  2  2  2 
Hangzhou  11  26  1  2  2  2 
Ningbo  35  27  1  2  2  2 
Nanning  20  28  1  2  2  2 
Hefei  12  29  1  1  3  2 
Taiyuan  4  30  1  2  3  2 
Changchun  7  31  1  1  2  3 
Xining  29  32  1  1  2  3 
Qingdao  32  33  1  1  2  3 
Harbin  8  34  1  1  2  3 
Nanjing  10  35  1  2  3  3 
# of Cluster  -  -  1  2  3  3 






Table 4. Regional diesel market convergence and clustering analysis results 
Cities  Code  Row  1995-1996  1997-1998  1999-2001  2002-2005 
Yinchuan  30  1  1  1  1  1 
Lhasa  26  2  1  1  1  1 
Shanghai  9  3  1  1  2  1 
Changsha  18  4  1  1  2  1 
Tianjin  2  5  1  1  2  1 
Hangzhou  11  6  1  1  2  1 
Ningbo  35  7  1  1  2  1 
Haikou  21  8  1  1  2  1 
Shenyang  6  9  1  1  2  1 
Guiyang  24  10  1  2  2  1 
Kunming  25  11  1  2  2  1 
Beijing  1  12  1  3  2  1 
Xining  29  13  1  3  2  1 
Shijiazhuang  3  14  1  3  2  1 
Urumqi  31  15  1  3  2  1 
Jinan  15  16  1  4  2  1 
Taiyuan  4  17  1  1  3  1 
Guangzhou  19  18  1  1  3  1 
Hohhot  5  19  1  2  3  1 
Zhengzhou  16  20  1  2  3  1 
Fuzhou  13  21  1  3  3  1 
Nanchang  14  22  1  4  3  1 
Hefei  12  23  1  2  4  1 
Changchun  7  24  1  1  2  2 
Harbin  8  25  1  1  2  2 
Nanning  20  26  1  1  2  2 
Chengdu  23  27  1  3  2  2 
Xi'an  27  28  1  3  2  2 
Lanzhou  28  29  1  3  2  2 
Dalian  33  30  1  4  2  2 
Wuhan  17  31  1  2  3  2 
Qingdao  32  32  1  3  3  2 
Xiamen  34  33  1  3  3  2 
Nanjing  10  34  1  4  3  2 
Chongqing  22  35  1  3  4  2 
# of Cluster    -  1  4  4  2 


































































































































































































Figure  1.  Energy  reforms  and  price  changes  for  pairs  of  coal -electricity  and 
gasoline-diesel at the national level 
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Figure 5: The evolution of diesel price convergence clusters over four sub-periods 
 